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NOTES
PRODUCT MARKET DEFINITION UNDER THE
SHERMAN AND CLAYTON ACTS
The allegation of lessened competition necessary to support charges
under several of the antitrust provisions must be tested with reference to
a market which defines where and in what this competition exists.' Sev-
eral recent cases have suggested, for the first time in the reported opinions,
that the relevant market to be examined in determining whether competi-
tion has been affected may vary depending on which of the antitrust pro-
visions is in question.2 More particularly, it has been suggested that the
relevant market under section 7 of the Clayton Act 3 differs from that under
section 2 of the Sherman Act 4 with respect to what products are included
in the market.
This Note will examine the legislative history of section 7 of the
Clayton Act to determine if any changes in market delineation standards
from those of the earlier Sherman Act were intended by the later act's
authors, compare the differences between the relevant markets delineated
in cases under the two acts, and analyze the reasons for and the propriety
of those variations which appear to exist.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SEcTIoN 7
A. Drafting and Amendment
In 1914 Congress passed the Clayton Act with the declared purpose
of invalidating certain trade practices against which, "singly and in them-
selves," the Sherman Act was not a sufficient bar.5 This was the specific
intention of the House Judiciary Committee, which wrote the Clayton
Bill.6
The commentators, looking on section 7 in its final form, have not
concluded that Congress intended to create a new definition of product
1 See, e.g., Arr'x, GEN. NATL Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 44-48 (1955).
2 See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-95
(1957); Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 814-15 (9th Cir. 1961),
petitionz for cert. filed, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3297 (U.S. March 16, 1962) ; United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 593 n.36 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
a64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
426 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §2 (1958).
5 S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
051 CONG. REc. 9070 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb in opening the House
discussions on the Clayton Bill).
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market for use under the Clayton Act.7  But a careful reading of the legis-
lative history suggests that the authors of the original bill are quite likely
to have sought to meet the weaknesses of the Sherman Act in this very way.
As originally reported to the House by the Judiciary Committee on
May 6, 1914, the relevant portion of section 7 (then numbered section 8)
reads as follows:
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect
of such acquisition is to eliminate or substantially lessen competi-
tion between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the
corporation making the acquisition, or to create a monopoly of
any line of trade in any section or community.5
The first clause-concerning the substantial lessening of competition
-sheds little light on product market delineation; here the focus, both in
the bill and in the final act,9 was on competition between the acquired and
acquiring firms. But the second clause-dealing with the effect on the
market as a whole of the creation of monopoly--can only have strengthened
the test of the Sherman Act by means of a changed market definition or
by removing the requirement of intent and confining the inquiry to anti-
competitive effects.
The subsequent legislative history of section 7, however, suggests that
the draftsmen of the bill did not conceive of that section as not requiring
proof of intention. In the course of debates 10 it was objected that the
Clayton Act's test, in inquiring into effects, was weaker than the Sherman
Act as interpreted in Northern Sec. Co. v. United States," wherein
the Supreme Court had held that in order to show a violation of section 1
7 See, e.g., MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON AcT 20-56 (1959); Mann &
Lewyn, The Relevant Market Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Two New Cases-
Two Different Views, 47 VA. L. REv. 1014 (1961); cf. Handler & Robinson, A
Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver Act, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 629 (1961).
8 H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1914). (Emphasis added.)
o S. Doc. No. 584, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914). The words "substantially
lessen" are meaningful without an assumption that competition in the market as a
whole was meant. Nor is it necessary, in order to give them meaning, to require
that the area in which the merging firms competed was a substantial part of the
firms' business. It has been suggested that the word "substantially" was intended to
deal with the situation where only part of the stock of a competitor was acquired,
giving the acquirer less than complete control, and a degree of control which was
not in each instance related in the same way to the proportion of stock acquired.
See MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON AcT 47 (1959). A discussion in American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958), is illustrative. The district court said, "[T]here
has been no proof that defendant's acquisition of stock has so far resulted in a
lessening of competition. The defendant so far has only a minority interest in the
voting stock of the plaintiff [the acquired] company." The defendant's purchase
of the plaintiff's stock was, however, admitted to be but one step in its program of
lessening competition. Id. at 395.
10 51 CONG. REc. 9271 (1914) ; see id. at 14464.
11193 U.S. 197, 327, 332 (1904).
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of the Sherman Act it was necessary only to prove that the power to
restrain trade had been created, not that it had been exercised. The bill's
proponents would have been expected to raise the argument that proof of
intent was not required under these circumstances had they so conceived
of the section.' 2 Instead, they pointed to the strict language of the first
clause of the proposed section1 3 and, finally, amended the bill to include
within its prohibitions stock acquisitions "where the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be . . . to restrain . . . commerce in any section or com-
munity, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce." 14
By contrast, the question of relevant market under the section was
not only not discussed but was never-insofar as product market was con-
cerned-called in issue. When the Senate sought to strike the words "in
any section or community," on the ground that they were either surplusage
or void as relating to intrastate commerce, the phrase was struck without
any meaningful discussion; 15 however, it reappeared after conference, no
longer modifying the monopoly phrase, but now describing acquisitions
whose effect was to restrain commerce.16
Hence, by a process of elimination, it seems that if section 7, as writ-
ten by the House Committee, reached acquisitions which would have been
legal under the Sherman Act, it must have done so by adopting a different
definition of the geographic or product market or both. There is, more-
over, some reason to find in the language of section 7, as enacted, an
intention to differentiate the market for that section from that which had
been used under the Sherman Act. As has been noted, the Claytoff Act
spoke in terms of "any line of commerce" and "any section or community."
The Sherman Act prohibited combinations resulting in monopolization of
"any part" of interstate commerce. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States,17
that phrase was stated to have "both a geographical and a distributive sig-
nificance." 18  However, Sherman Act cases had generally dealt with a
geographic market which was nationwide. 19 The words "in any section or
community" clearly refer to a market that is less than nationwide.
The intended effect of the phrase "in any line of commerce" is not as
clear. Possibly the intention with respect to the product market paralleled
12 Compare H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949) (dealing with the
1950 amendments to § 7).
13 51 CONG. RFc. 9271 (1914).
14 S. Doc. No. 584, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914). (Emphasis added.) See 51
CONG. REc. 14464 (1914).
15 S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1914). During the Senate debates
a motion to eliminate in its entirety this clause relating to creation of a monopoly
was rejected. 51 CONG. REc. 14462 (1914).
16 S. Doc. 584, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914).
17221 U.S. 1 (1911).
is Id. at 61.
19 See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 155-75 (1911);
Standard Oil Co. v; United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) ; United States v. E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 188 Fed. 127, 145 (C.C.D. Del. 1911), modified, 273 Fed. 869
(C.C.D. Del. 1921). But see Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
864 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.110:861
that with respect to the geographic market, in the hopes that a narrower
market would effectuate the purposes of the Clayton Act's antimerger
provisions. A narrowly defined market, however, does not necessarily lead
in the direction of invalidation of a merger. When the products of com-
peting firms are identical, the more narrowly defined the market is, the
greater their share will be, and the less likely the merger to survive.
However, in any case involving the merger of alleged competitors, the mar-
ket must be defined broadly enough to encompass the products of both
firms.2 0 Thus Congress could have most strengthened the act by providing
that the boundaries of the market fluctuate with the type of acquisition
under consideration. Some suggestion of this intention may be found in
the requirement that anticompetitive effects be tested not in the, but in any
line of commerce. At any rate, the implication is strong that some effect
different from that of the Sherman Act was intended; its phrase "any part"
of commerce could have been retained to describe the distributive element,
but was not.
B. Judicial Construction
In the years after the passage of the Clayton Act, the interpretations of
its section 7 and of the Sherman Act in a sense converged. First, the
courts read into section 7 a requirement that the acquisition have lessened
competition "to such a degree as [would] injuriously affect the public." 21
This test required by implication that the competition between the merging
firms had been substantial in terms of the market as a whole; otherwise
the public could not be injured.22  Second, Sherman Act cases began to
deal with more limited geographic markets.2
Product market definition problems were important in two section 7
cases under the 1914 act, in both of which the market was narrowly de-
fined. In FTC v. Thatcher Mfg. Co.,24 a manufacturer of milk bottles
had acquired a manufacturer of fruit juice and soft drink bottles and fruit
jars. The Third Circuit, finding the relevant market to be milk bottles,
rather than glass bottles and jars in general, held that the acquisition did
not result in a prohibited effect on competition. In International Shoe Co.
v. FTC,25 the Supreme Court took a similarly narrow view of the relevant
2 0 See, e.g., American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d
524, 529 (2d Cir. 1958).
2
1 International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1930). In United States v.
Republic Steel Corp., 11 F. Supp. 117, 123 (N.D. Ohio 1935), a § 7 case, the court
specifically stated that it was applying Sherman Act criteria.
22 See Temple Anthracite Coal Co. v. FTC, 51 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1931);
V. Vivaudou, Inc. v. FTC, 54 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1931); United States v. Republic
Steel Corp., supra note 21, at 124-25.
23 See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 519-20 (1948);
Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing Co., 293 U.S.
268, 278-79 (1934); cf. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,
171-74 (1948).
245 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1925), modified sub. nom. FTC v. Western Meat Co.,
272 U.S. 554 (1926).
25280 U.S. 291 (1930).
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market, finding that two lines of comparably priced men's dress shoes were
not in competition because of differences in style, construction, and market-
ing techniques. Once again, the result of narrow market definition was
to make the acquisition valid under section 7.26 The markets defined in
these two cases appear to be narrower than those used under Sherman
Act cases of the same period,27 although the opinions do not articulate
either an intention to apply a different market definition or any reason for
such a difference. Interestingly, the result of this apparent difference is
to render the Clayton Act's provisions less rather than more stringent
than those of the Sherman Act, despite a clear congressional intention to
the contrary.
C. The 1950 Amendments
The declared purpose of the 1950 amendments of the Clayton Act was
"to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before
they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceed-
ing," 2 8 and "to limit future increases in the level of economic concentra-
tion resulting from corporate mergers and acquisitions." -
Although the main thrust of the 1950 amendments to section 7 was to
include asset as well as stock acquisitions within the section's scope, 0 the
section was further changed to prohibit either sort of acquisition "where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly." 31 The test of a restraint of commerce in any section or
community was omitted entirely. Thus, the phrase "in any line of com-
merce" was retained to define the product market and was applied to the
lessening of competition as well as the tendency to create a monopoly.
The geographic market definition, changed to relate to "any section of the
country," was likewise applied to both these effects.
The legislative history of the 1950 amendments is not illuminating on
the question of whether the section 7 market (or the similarly defined sec-
tion 3 market 32) was intended to differ in any way from the markets under
the Sherman Act or the 1914 version of the Clayton Act. The meaning
of the qualifying phrases was discussed only in the most general terms.
8 8
26 Id. at 298-99.
27 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (1945);
United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234 Fed. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dLs-
missed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919).
2s S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950).
29Id. at 3.
80 Handler & Robinson, vipra note 7, at 652.
a'64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
32 Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits exclusive dealing or tying contracts
where the effect "may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
3 The House Judiciary Committee, for example, stated that "the test of sub-
stantial lessening of competition or tending to create a monopoly is not intended to
be applicable only where the specified effect may appear on a Nation-wide or industry-
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In the committee hearings George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American
Can Co.34 was cited to demonstrate that any line of commerce means any
line of commerce. But that case determined only that the effect of a price
discrimination in lessening competition need not be shown in the line of
commerce in which the discriminator was engaged and that the line of
commerce affected need not be "a large part of the business of any of the
corporations involved in the acquisition." 35 Although the House judiciary
Committee report approved International Shoe 36 with respect to its hold-
ing that a substantial lessening of competition, to be illegal, must be in the
market as a whole and not merely between the acquired and acquiring com-
panies,37 it should not readily be concluded that this approval extended to
the market analysis used in that case. This seems particularly true in the
light of the telling dissent of Justices Stone, Holmes, and Brandeis, which
showed the doubtful economic validity of the analysis as applied to the
facts of International Shoe itself.
38
D. Conclusion
An examination of the legislative history of section 7 of the Clayton
Act, both as originally enacted and as amended in 1950, reveals no articu-
lated attempt to provide market definition standards different from those
under the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, it seems likely that Congress, in
drafting the 1914 act, intended to effect some change in market definition.
This likelihood is supported by the facts that (1) different market-defining
language was used, (2) at least as to geographic market, this language
clearly defined a market narrower than that which had been used in
previous Sherman Act cases, and (3) unless this language defined a market
different from that under the Sherman Act, the standard of illegality
relating to the creation of a monopoly would have been of little effect as
originally proposed.
The history of the 1950 amendments is even less illuminating. Never-
theless, it seems fair to say that the narrow market of International Shoe
was not there enacted into law. As to the more difficult question, it seems
wide scale. The purpose of the bill is to protect competition in each line of commerce
in each section of the country." H.P. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
In discussing the changed geographic market definition, the Senate Committee stated
that the elimination of the word "community" was specifically intended to rule out the
testing of the anti-competitive effects of a merger in any area such as a small town.
S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950). The phrase "section of the country,"
it was stated, could not be rigidly defined, although certain broad standards could be
set forth to guide the courts and the Commission in their interpretation. Id. at 5-6.
The Senate Committee approved the definition of the market set forth by the Supreme
Court in the Standard Stations case, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S.
293 (1949), in terms of the "area of effective competition."
34278 U.S. 245 (1929). See Hearings on H.R. 2739 Before a Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 192 (1949-50).
35 S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950).
3 6 International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
37 H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949).
38280 U.S. at 304-05. The court's holding is all the less meaningful in that
the opinion also grapples with the "failing company" doctrine. See id. at 299-303.
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impossible to demonstrate that the legislative intention was clearly either
to create a market definition different from that existing under the Sherman
Act or to require that the Sherman Act standard be applied under section
7. In fact, it seems difficult to show that market definition was considered
at all in any meaningful way.
II. MARKET DEFINITION IN THE COURTS
To the economist, the concept of a market is stated in terms of the
behavior of buyers and sellers: "[T] wo products belong in the same market
if a small change in price (or product) causes a significant diversion in a
relatively short time of the buyers' purchases or the sellers' production from
one product to another." 39 The courts have somewhat limited the first
part of this definition by including in a single market only those products
which are also functionally interchangeable with the products sought to be
placed in the market. Both functional interchangeability and production
flexibility have been examined in Sherman and Clayton Act cases requir-
ing a delineation of the relevant market. It is necessary, then, to examine
the cases to determine whether these theories of market definition have
been differently applied under the two acts.
A. Production Flexibility
In United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,40 it was charged that United
States Steel, a producer of rolled steel products, had restrained commerce
under the Sherman Act by acquiring Consolidated Steel, a purchaser of
steel plates and shapes, a type of rolled steel product. Because rolled steel
producers can make other products interchangeably with shapes and plates,
the Court concluded that the relevant market for testing the effects of the
acquisition was the market for all rolled steel products-although no actual
shifts in production were shown.4
This interpretation of production flexibility does not appear to be
economically significant in terms of market delineation for two reasons.
First, Columbia Steel considered only the technological feasibility of pro-
duction shifts, not whether such shifts occurred in actual practice. But it
is only "where producers can and do produce several products interchange-
ably [that] the capacity currently devoted to one of those products under-
states the amount that should fairly be deemed to be 'in' the market." 4
2
Second, the economic concept of cross-elasticity of supply as a definitiont
of what products are included in the market is based on shifts in produc-
tion resulting from changes in price43 It hardly seems applicable when
3 9 KAYSEN AND TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYsIs
27-28 (1959).
40334 U.S. 495 (1948).
41Id. at 510-11.
42 KAYSEN AND TURNER, op. cit. supra note 39, at 134. (Emphasis added.)
43 See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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the shift is due, instead, to the elimination of a potential purchaser through
its acquisition by the shifting company's competitor."
Columbia Steel's interpretation of production flexibility as a market-
defining factor was emphatically rejected by lower courts in three section 7
cases: Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC,45 United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp.,4 6 and United States v. Brown Shoe Co.47 Two explanations were
given. One was that Columbia Steel was a proceeding under the Sherman
Act and therefore not determinative of the section 7 market. No reasons
were given for this distinction, nor was any authority offered in support
of the implicit holdings that the relevant market definitions under the two
acts might properly differ. The other basis of the decisions was that al-
though production flexibility was a theoretical possibility, producers of one
sort of goods did not in fact shift production to other goods. Thus, in
Bethlehem, the court refused to expand the relevant market because "in
practice steel producers have not been quick to shift from product to prod-
uct in response to demand. Moreover, the evidence establishes that the
continuing relationships between buyers and sellers in the steel industry
make such shifts unlikely." 48 This language was quoted with approval
by the Ninth Circuit in Crown Zellerbach after a finding that it was not the
practice of sellers to shift production because they had established cus-
tomers and were selling through brokerage channels. 9 Likewise, in Brown
Shoe, men's, women's, and children's shoes were held to be separate lines
of commerce because, although certain machinery is readily, adaptable to
the production of each of these lines, shoe manufacturers who produce all
three lines normally do so in separate plants.50
B. Functional Interchangeability
Whereas production flexibility, with its emphasis on the producer, has
been infrequently employed in market delineation, functional interchange-
ability or other concepts describing the market from the consumer's stand-
point have been the typical criteria for product market definition under
both the Clayton and Sherman Acts.
44 Production flexibility caused by such a foreclosure of a part of the market
is relevant only to the protection of competitors of the alleged violator, not to the
protection of competition in the market for its product. Whether or not protection
of competitors in and of itself (as distinguished from a means to protection of
competition) is or should be a factor in determining if competition has been substan-
tially lessened or monopolization taken place, it is not a factor in determining the
boundaries of the relevant product market; if producers can easily shift production to
products other than the one allegedly monopolized, the "monopolist!' may find it easier
to occupy the entire field.
45 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), petition for cert. filed, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3297
(U.S. March 16, 1962).
46 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
47 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959), prob. juris. noted, 363 U.S. 825 (1960).
48 168 F. Supp. at 592.
49 296 F.2d at 812-13.
50 179 F. Supp. at 731-32
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In Sherman Act cases,51 the rule for determination of the relevant
market was first enunciated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Corn Prods. Ref. C0.52  Products physically distinct from but func-
tionally interchangeable with the allegedly monopolized product must be
included in the relevant product market unless the allegedly monopolized
product possesses a substantial advantage in either consumer preference
or cost of production.53 The economic concept of cross-elasticity of demand
was introduced into market delineation by the Supreme Court in Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United Statesr in which the relevant market
was limited to newspaper advertising despite the defendant's contention
that it should include other means of communication.5 5 The Court rea-
soned that a reasonable variation in price would cause only a limited
number of buyers to change from newspaper to other mass media, or vice-
versa; hence the cross-elasticity of demand was small and the markets
distinct.58
The leading Sherman Act monopolization case, United States v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.57 (the "Cellophane" case), stated that
the relevant market is composed of products that have "reasonable inter-
changeability for the purposes for which they are produced-price, use
and qualities considered." 5 8 The Court's opinion contains language re-
peating the admonition of Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America 59 that interindustry competition has no place
in defining the market for Sherman Act purposes. But whereas the court
51 Throughout this section of this Note, the discussion will be directed primarily
to Sherman Act monopolization cases. There has been little attempt to delimit the
relevant market for the Sherman Act merger case. See note 110 infra. In Sherman
Act attempt and conspiracy cases a very narrow definition of the relevant market is
employed; the market as there defined need not be a market in any meaningful eco-
nomic sense. See Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARv. L. Rsv.
281, 290 (1956). Specific intent is required to prove an attempt or conspiracy viola-
tion, but the monopoly need have been intended over only some appreciable amount
of commerce. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). No showing that the intended
monopoly power was achieved is needed to show a violation. United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., mupra at 531-32 (attempt); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100, 107 n.9 (1948) (conspiracy) ; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 789 (1946) (conspiracy). Therefore, it is not considered whether products
physically distinct from, but functionally interchangeable with the product sought
to be monopolized are included within the market.
52234 Fed. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919). In
Corn; Products, monopolization charges were directed against a firm whose market
power was in part the result of mergers with its competitors. However, the viola-
tion charged was that of monopolization, not combination to monopolize.
53 Id. at 975-77.
54 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
55 Id. at 611-12.
56 Id. at 612 n.31. Defendant-publisher had instituted a "unit plan" for the
purchase of advertising space in his two newspapers, under which space in both
had to be purchased if space in one-the only morning newspaper in town-was desired.
Despite the Court's choosing a narrower market than that urged by defendant, the
defense prevailed, since no market dominance or unreasonable restraint was found.
57351 U.S. 377 (1956).
58 Id. at 404.
59 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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in Alcoa did not consider competition of aluminum with copper and steel,60
the Court in Cellophane confined its market limitation to language. And
it continued by saying that it is not "a proper interpretation of the Sherman
Act to require that products be fungible to be considered in the relevant
market." 61 More specifically, the Court concluded that the relevant mar-
ket in a suit charging monopolization of cellophane production and sales
was made up of all "flexible packaging materials," including brown wrap-
ping paper, wax paper, glassine, polyethelene film, and aluminum foil,62
despite the fact that cellophane combined "the desirable elements of trans-
parency, strength and cheapness more definitely than any of the others." 63
In the most recent Supreme Court case concerned with the Sherman
Act market, International Boxing Club v. United States,6 4 the Court re-
stated the reasonable interchangeability test of Cellophane, but placed
greater emphasis on its limitation: "price, use, and qualities considered."
Thus, the Court was able to conclude that championship and nonchampion-
ship boxing matches were not in the same market-although they might
be physically identical, involving the same combatants in the same ring-
because of a sizeable price differential ,based on consumer preference.6 5
The Court also noted,66 by way of dictum, that the market which it had
defined met the Clayton Act section 7 market definition test as set forth
in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (the "General
Motors" case).
67
The General Motors case contained the first intimation that the rele-
vant market for section 7 purposes might be defined in a manner other than
that used in Sherman Act monopolization cases. The Court stated that
du Pont, after its acquisition of 23% of General Motors outstanding stock,
enjoyed a "commanding position as General Motors' supplier of automotive
finishes and fabrics . ... " 6 The market delineation issue therefore
turned on whether all finishes and fabrics for industrial uses or only "auto-
motive finishes and fabrics" comprised the line of commerce for testing
the effects of the acquisition. Without referring to the Cellophane case,
which had been decided less than a year before, the Court stated:
60 The district court opinion had placed some weight on interindustry competi-
tion. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97, 165, 222-23
(S.D.N.Y. 1941).
61351 U.S. at 394.
62 Id. app. A at 405.
63 351 U.S. at 398.
64358 U.S. 242 (1959).
65 Id. at 249-52.
66 Id. at 252 n.8.
67353 U.S. 586 (1957). General Motors was decided under old § 7, but under
the phrase making illegal acquisitions whose probable effect was to tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce. This standard was found by the court to
be applicable to a vertical merger such as took place here, du Pont having purchased
an interest in its customer, General Motors. Id. at 590-92.
68 Id. at 588-89.
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[TJhe record shows that automotive finishes and fabrics have
sufficient peculiar characteristics and uses to constitute them prod-
ucts sufficiently distinct from all other finishes and fabrics to make
them a "line of commerce" within the meaning of the Clayton
Act. . . . Thus, the bounds of the relevant market . . . are
not coextensive with the total market for finishes and fabrics, but
. . . with [that of] the automobile industry, the relevant market
for automotive finishes and fabrics.39
It is not clear whether General Motors attempted to set up standards
for determining the section 7 market different from those used under the
Sherman Act. However, some subsequent section 7 cases have applied its
"peculiar characteristics and uses" test, stating that the reasonable inter-
changeability test of the Cellophane case is inapplicable to section 7 litiga-
tion. Thus, in Bethlehem Steel,70 the district court stated that "there can
be a substantial lessening of competition with respect to a product whether
or not there are reasonably interchangeable substitutes." 71 However, the
existence of products effectively substitutable for the various steel product
lines found to constitute lines of commerce was considered by the court 72
and found not to exist.73 A similar exposition was used by the court in
Crown Zellerbach 74 on the authority of Bethlehem Steel, .but again the
court noted that the contention that there were interchangeable products
was "simply not borne out by the facts." 7r Two other section 7 cases
which have applied the "peculiar characteristics and uses" test are A. G.
Spalding & Bros. v. FTC 76 and Reynolds Metals Co. 77 Spalding, in con-
sidering the merger of two athletic goods producers who sold chiefly high
quality goods for athletic competitions, used a product market which ex-
cluded low quality athletic goods used for toys.78 Reynolds involved a
69Id. at 593-95. As noted by the dissent, id. at 650, the majority failed to
specify just what these peculiar characteristics and uses were, mentioning only that
du Pont's automotive finish was a great contribution to the automobile industry, id.
at 594 n.12.
7 0 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
In this case a merger between the second and sixth largest steel companies, both
integrated, was attacked by the Government. The court held that the relevant lines
of commerce included both lines consisting of certain steel products and a line
embracing the entire industry. Id. at 589-95.
71 Id. at 593-94 n.36.
72 Ibid.
73 Id. at 593.
74 Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), petition for
cert. filed, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3297 (U.S. March 16, 1962).
75 Id. at 814.
76 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962).
77 TRADE REG. REP. f128533 (FTC Jan. 21, 1960).
78 A. G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962). In both Spalding,
id. at 628, and United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 594 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), the courts defined an industrywide line of commerce, in addition to a series
of narrower lines as a relevant market. Although common parlance might thus
characterize an entire industry, definitions of the phrase "line of commerce" under
the Clayton Act have otherwise been confined to products competitively related in
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forward vertical acquisition of a customer, a converter of aluminum florist
foil. The relevant market was limited to florist foil, after a discussion of its
peculiar characteristics and uses. 79 The FTC concluded that there were
no practical substitutes for florist foil, but went out of its way to state that
a question of end-use interchangeability, such as was presented in Cello-
phane, was not "involved" in Reynolds.80
On the other hand, the doctrine of interchangeability has been im-
plicitly adopted in two section 7 cases which applied it without considera-
tion of whether or not relevant market boundaries were to be judged by
the same standards in section 7 as in monopolization cases. Thus in
American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,81 the relevant
market was held to include both beet and cane sugar since they were found
by the court to be functionally interchangeable.m And in Erie Sand &
Gravel Co. v. FTC,83 it was found that pit and bank sand were function-
ally interchangeable with lake sand, and therefore to be included within
the relevant market absent any disparity in freight costs which would have
meant that pit and bank sand could not compete in the relevant geographic
market.84
In the recent decision in Brown Shoe,8 5 the district court in effect
combined the tests of functional interchangeability and peculiar character-
istics and uses. The court cited the definitions of relevant markets set forth
in both Cellophane and General Motors,s 6 and fixed the boundaries of the
market by examining "the practices in the industry, the characteristics and
uses of the products, their interchangeability, price, quality and style
S. .,s In United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,88 the district
terms of end use, or, less frequently, production flexibility. The FTC in Spalding
found that there were competitive relationships among the various individual products.
A. G. Spalding & Bros., TRADE REG. REP. 28694 (FTC March 30, 1960). However,
it seems unlikely that competition between baseballs and footballs could be more
intense than that among different quality lines of one or the other product, and
neither the court's nor the FTC's opinion so suggests. The choice of industrywide
lines of commerce in these two cases was not significant in terms of the judgments
rendered, since in each case the court found a substantial lessening of competition
likely within the individual product lines. The broader market thus defined might
be significant in the rare case in which the merged firms' lines were concentrated
in different sections of this broad market.
7
9 TRADE REG. REP. 1 28533, at 37253-54.
so Id. at 37256.
81259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
82 In another context, the court noted that certain types of consumers showed
a preference for cane sugar. However, the court did not feel that this demonstrated
an absence of competition between cane and beet sugar, "but only that for the time
being as to certain customers one or the other form of the product for one reason or
another has forged ahead in the competitive race. . . ." Id. at 530.
83 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961).
84 Id. at 281.
85United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959), prob.
juris. noted, 363 U.S. 825 (1960).
86 Id. at 729-30.
87 Id. at 730.
88 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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court considered the two tests "but different verbalizations of the same
criterion . ".8.. 9 It was there stated that section 7 "demands an ex-
amination into economic realities. All competition must be considered, in-
cluding competition faced by the product in question from other prod-
ucts . . . ." 0 Thus evidence that feature films were interchangeable
with all television programing was held to refute the government's conten-
tion that feature films had peculiar characteristics and uses.91 This is in
contrast with the recent FTC opinion in Union Carbide Corp.,92 which re-
quired the delineation of the relevant market for polyethylene film. Poly-
ethylene film was one of the flexible packaging materials included in the
relevant market in the Cellophane case.93 Although the FTC stated that
its delineation of the market was in harmony with that of Cellophane,"
the market was limited to polyethylene film because of the consumer
preference which had been shown to exist for it.95 In a dissenting opinion,
it was insisted that Union Carbide was controlled by Cellophane, despite
the fact that Cellophane was decided under the Sherman Act, since any
distinction between the relevant markets under the two acts was
"specious." 9
C. Conclusion
If the rule of Columbia Steel is law under the Sherman Act, then the
relevant product markets under it and the Clayton Act do differ with
respect to production flexibility. Nevertheless, the section 7 cases have not
89 Id. at 184.
90Id. at 183. In context, this did not include interindustry competition, since
only television programing was under consideration.
91 Id. at 190-91.
92 3 TRADE REG. RE'. 15503 (FTC Sept. 15, 1961).
93 See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra.
94 The hearing examiner, apparently feeling that Cellophane was not applicable,
had held that the relevant market was polyethylene film, based on the General Motors
peculiar characteristics and uses test. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 15503, at 20371-72. The
Commission, however, stated that this narrow market was in harmony with both
Cellophane and General Motors. Id. at 20372.
95 Id. at 20372-73. The Commission gave no reason why such consumer prefer-
ence had not influenced the Court in Cellophane. Once having found this consumer
preference, the Commission stated that any competition between polyethylene film
and other flexible packaging materials was "inter-product," id. at 20373, apparently
alluding to the interindustry dictum in Cellophane. See notes 57-60 supra and
accompanying text.
963 TRADE REG. REP. 1 15503, at 20382. Nor was the majority emphasis on
consumer preference for polyethylene film thought to be determinative; "these minor
product advantages with respect to what are essentially competitive products con-
stitute the essence of vital and vigorous competition . . . ," and research might
nullify the supposed superiority of one product within a short time. Ibid.
Definition of the relevant product market is also necessary under § 3 of the
Clayton Act, which prohibits exclusive dealing and tying agreements when the effect
of an agreement "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
Although authority as to the extent of the relevant market under § 3 is rare, it
was suggested in the recent case of Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276
F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 320 (1960), that the relevant
market for § 3 might be narrower than that for monopolization offenses. See also
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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only failed to enunciate reasons why the test should be differently applied
under the two acts, they have shown so convincingly why production flexi-
bility as it was used in Columbia Steel is generally so unsuited to market
delineation that it is unlikely that courts today would apply it even in
Sherman Act cases. Three considerations produce this prognosis. First,
the section 7 cases reflect refinements in product market delineation de-
veloped since the 1948 decision in Columbia Steel. Second, that decision
runs contrary to the policy of the antitrust laws in that it would sustain
actual monopolies on the basis of illusory production flexibility. Third, it
does not appear from the opinion that an economically meaningful view
of production flexibility-as contrasted with technological potentiality-
was presented to the Court in Columbia Steel, as it was in the three section
7 cases.
No such clear difference exists between section 7 and Sherman Act
cases with respect to functional interchangeability. Nevertheless, it is pos-
sible to draw some general conclusions from the decisions under the two
acts and to see in the cases some indication that, on the whole, the relevant
market with respect to functional interchangeability is narrower under the
Clayton than under the Sherman Act.
Thus, although the "peculiar characteristics and uses" test recently
applied in section 7 cases allows consideration of the same elements as the
more traditional test of interchangeability ("price, use, and qualities con-
sidered") used under both acts, the new test seems to-and, as applied,
does-stress the peculiarity of the characteristics and uses of the product
rather than its interchangeability with other physically distinct products.
Again, although the two lower court section 7 cases which explicitly
reject Cellophane 97 were not required to do so on their facts in both
Bethlehem Steel 98 and Crown Zellerbach,99 the courts found that there
were in fact no interchangeable products-the relevant markets in both
those cases and in General Motors 1oo were much narrower than that used
in Cellophane.101 On the other hand, American Crystal Sugar 102 and Erie
Sand,0 8 which applied the Cellophane test to section 7 cases, would have
been decided in the same way under either test, since the products included
in the market used were practically fungible. Thus, although there is no
indication in the section 7 cases that interchangeability is completely irrele-
vant-nor should there be, since the legislative history of the act requires
97351 U.S. 377 (1956).
98 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
99 296 F2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).
100 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
lol A recent district court case might indicate that in an extraordinary economic
situation the General Motors test might produce a broader market than that of Cello-
phane. See United States v. Koppers Co., 202 F. Supp. 437, 444-46 (W.D. Pa.
1962).
102 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
103 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961).
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that the market defined be economically meaningful 101-, none of them
showed a willingness to widen the market to the degree suggested in
Cellophane.
In addition, although the Cellophane case's broad language may not in
fact be applicable to even Sherman Act cases-not only does the inclusion
of such different products as paper and aluminum foil in the same market
seem to conflict with the case's own doctrine as to the exclusion of inter-
industry competition,10 5 but International Boxing Club,106 by its emphasis
on consumer preference, may have narrowed the section 2 monopolization
market-this does not imply that the markets are identical under the two
acts. Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court in International Boxing
Club, having noted the existence of both the traditional test 10 7 and the new
test as used in General Motors,0 8 chose to point out that on the particular
facts before it the market delineated met either test may indicate a recogni-
tion that under other factual situations the markets may be different.'0 9
III. A RATIONALE FOR PRODUCT MARKET DIFFERENCES
The legislative history of the Clayton Act suggests that the relevant
market under that statute may have been designed to differ from that under
the Sherman Act. However, although courts have recently shown a
tendency to delineate different relevant markets under the two acts, this
cannot be attributed to the courts' view of that legislative history.
It may be significant, on the other hand, that Cellophane, the leading
Sherman Act case in which a broad market was defined, was a single-entity
monopolization, not a merger-combination case. 0 Since section 7 of the
Clayton Act attacks only the latter, the courts may be implicitly drawing
a distinction between monopolization and merger. Three considerations
appear to justify this distinction: (1) the differences in the severity of the
remedies applied; (2) the nature of the conduct involved and the inferences
104 See S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1950).
105 See notes 62-63 upra and accompanying text.
106358 U.S. 242 (1959).
107 Id. at 252.
108 Id. at 252 n.8.
109 But see Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-
Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 CoLum. L. R-v. 629, 646 (1961), which draws the
conclusion that this statement intimates "that the market is the market whether the
case arises under the Sherman or the Clayton Act."
110 Although there have been a number of Sherman Act merger cases, the market
was significantly discussed in only two, United States v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 234
Fed. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), appeal dismissed, 249 U.S. 621 (1919) and United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). In Corn Products, the de-
fendants were charged with monopolizing trade in starch and glucose by means of
acquiring other companies. The market was narrowly defined to exclude competing
products which cost substantially more to produce, or which enjoyed a substantial
margin of consumer preference over the allegedly monopolized products. In Columbia
Steel, the Court used production flexibility to define a wide market which, by its
inclusion of other products, reduced the share controlled by the defendants. 334
U.S. at 510-11. However, it is doubtful if this application of the theory of produc-
tion flexibility will be of lasting effect. See pp. 873-74 supra.
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of intent that can be drawn from it; I" and (3) the general policy of the
antitrust laws.
Thus, the remedy of dissolution normally used in individual monop-
olization cases appears to be much more harsh than the divestiture of a
recently acquired, previously independent unit. The internal effect on
du Pont of the forced sale of its General Motors holdings 11 2 is unlikely
to be of the same crippling nature as the forced severance or dissolution of
its cellophane department, an integral part of the company, would have
been.11 Moreover, mergers may be enjoined, and even when a court
refuses to grant a preliminary injunction it may, as did the court in Brown
Shoe," 4 require that the businesses of the merging companies be separately
conducted so that if divestiture is required in the end, its detrimental effects
on the companies may be minimized." 5
Again, in cases of individual monopolization, the inferences which
may be drawn from the defendant's conduct-at least when it would not
constitute a restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act-are
unclear.1" Not only may monopoly be technologically justified, but it may
have been "thrust upon" 11.7 the monopolist as a result of patent ownership,
successful meeting of demand, or a limited market for the monopoly's
product. Although it is likewise possible for a merger to be technologically
justified, this is less likely; the firms existed independently before the
merger, and, particularly as the percentage of the market occupied by the
combined firms increases, technological advantages are not, in fact, the
normal reason for mergers of competitors." 8
Finally, the general policy of the antitrust laws is against increasing
concentration. 19 But, whereas section 7 of the Clayton Act is directed
against "increases in the level of economic concentration resulting from
"'l This theory, insofar as it concerns differences in relevant market definitions
under the several Sherman Act violations, is put forward in Turner, Antitrust Policy
and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARv. L. Rxv. 281 (1956).
112This seems to hold true even though the acquisition here antedated the
antitrust action by more than thirty years and involved an extremely large portion of
du Pont's assets. However, no consolidation had taken place.
118 Compare United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316
(1961), with the facts of United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377 (1956).
114 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959), prob. juris. noted, 363 U.S. 825 (1960).
1151Id. at 724 n.4. The remedy in Clayton Act § 3 cases, elimination of the
contract, seems less severe than either dissolution or divestiture.
116 Conversely, the nature of the conduct in cases of attempts and conspiracies
to monopolize supports inferences clearly unfavorable to the defendants, since specific
intent to accomplish the desired end must be shown. See note 51 supra.
117 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d
Cir. 1945) (dictum).
118 FTC, RELATIVE EFFIciENcy op' LARGE, MEDIUM-SIZED, AND SMA.L Business
12-14 (TNEC Monograph No. 13, 1941); Bowman, Toward Less Monopoly, 101
U. PA. L. REv. 577, 590-611 (1953).
119 See Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467
(1941); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir.
1945).
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corporate mergers and acquisitions," 120 there is no parallel provision
interdicting bigness resulting from normal business practices alone until
this bigness results in monopoly.m2
Therefore, in cases of individual monopolization, all of the factors
considered tend to justify a broad definition of the market, with its resulting
increase in protection for the defendant. For, although such a definition of
the market, in which are included physically distinct but functionally inter-
changeable products, is close to the market as defined by economists,lm the
administrative difficulties of a full-fledged inquiry into functional inter-
changeability such as took place in Cellophane might not otherwise be
warranted.
Consideration of these same factors leads to a different conclusion in
the merger cases. Since the remedy is less severe, the court need not feel
the same solicitude for the plight of the defendant. The inferences to be
drawn from the conduct are probably less favorable to the defendant. And
the general policy of the antitrust laws against greater concentration is
reinforced in this area by specific interdictions of combinations, acquisi-
tions, and mergers. It therefore seems proper that the product market be
defined for mergers so as to test more strictly their anticompetitive effects.
This would usually, but not always, require a more narrowly defined
market; 23 thus a flexible market is required.124
There is nothing in the language of the Clayton Act which militates
against such a flexible market. The reference to any rather than the line
of commerce may even support such a market definition. And it may be
suggested that the legislative history of the 1914 act can only be rationally
explained by an intention that the relevant market under section 7 should
be a flexible one.12 5
This reasoning does not support a judicial abdication permittingthe
government to define markets however it may choose in order to lead to
the invalidation of all mergers. Erie Sand 2 6 indicates that the courts
will not accept an FTC definition which is so narrowly drawn that it places
fungible products in different markets. Nor is a definition acceptable
120 S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1950).
1
21 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932); United States
v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927); see United States v.
United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920); United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
I22 See text accompanying note 39 =rpra.
'2 When the firms seeking to merge are not engaged in an identical line of com-
merce, a broader market definition will be needed to support a finding of a § 7 vio-
lation. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
124 Although this reasoning would apply to mergers under both the Sherman
and the Clayton Acts, the possibility of criminal penalties may make such flexibility
appear offensive under the Sherman Act. However, since the amendment of the
Clayton Act in 1950, it is not likely that the Sherman Act's provisions will be
resorted to by the FTC or the Justice Department to test the legality of a merger.
See ATIY GEN. NATL Commi. ANTITRUST REP. 115 n.1 (1955).
1
2 5 See notes 5-20 s-upra and accompanying text.
126 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961).
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solely because it is based on the product sold by the merging companies;
competitive products must be considered.
12 7
Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to assume that there is ever, in any
competitive situation, such a thing as "the" market. Several markets may
be defined in any case; 128 invalidation under section 7 should be possible
upon proof of a lessening of competition under any one of several reasonable
market definitions.
J.N.D.
127 Brillo Mfg. Co., 54 F.T.C. 1905, 1906 (1958).
128 See, e.g., A. G. Spalding & Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962);
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1962); United States
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
